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OnTheRecord
After going gangbusters for years, the housing industry faces loan problems, weaker 
building activity and soft prices. John V. Duca, a Dallas Fed vice president and senior 
economist, tracks the national housing market.
A Conversation with John V. Duca and D’Ann Petersen
The Housing Market, After the Boom
Q: Talk about the recent evolution of the 
subprime mortgage market.
A: In 2006, subprime loans accounted for 24 
percent of mortgage originations, including re-
financings. To put things into perspective, the 
subprime share has more than tripled so far 
this decade. The rapid run-up coincides with 
the strong spurt we saw in home construction, 
home sales and home-price appreciation.
Q: When did the subprime market start to 
unravel?
A:  We  started  hearing  some  early  rum-
blings late last year, but it really didn’t get 
noteworthy until February. At that point, 
we started seeing a noticeable pullback in 
lending,  mainly  because  loose  standards 
had led to a deterioration in loan quality 
beyond what lenders had anticipated.
But  we  can’t  ignore  the  fact  that 
home-price  appreciation  started  slowing 
in  late  2006.  Borrowers  were  no  longer 
as able to obtain new financing to service 
higher mortgage payments.
Until  then,  rapid  home-price  appre-
ciation  had  enabled  many  homeowners 
to either borrow more to meet their mort-
gage payments or sell at a profit and re-
tire their loans. With home prices flat or 
down in parts of the country, many recent 
subprime borrowers could no longer tap 
gains, nor could they sell their homes at a 
high enough price to cover selling costs, 
outstanding principal and mortgage pay-
ments they’d missed.
Q: What about the so-called Alt-A mortgages 
we’re hearing about?
A:  Alternative-A  mortgages  are  loans  to 
buyers who don’t qualify for low-risk con-
forming loans because their credit score is 
too low, down payment is too low or pay-
ment-to-income ratio is too high. In some 
when they bought starter homes, then had 
to “buy up” four to five years later.
Q: Aren’t many of these families in a 
distressed state because they bought more 
home than they could afford?
A: Yes, this is suggested by data from the 
Mortgage Bankers Association, which show 
that  overall  delinquencies  were  running 
at 4.9 percent in the fourth quarter of last 
year, up from a recent low of 4.3 percent in 
the first quarter of 2005. The deterioration 
is even more pronounced on the subprime 
side, where delinquencies rose to 13.3 per-
cent from their recent low of 10.3 percent in 
the second quarter of 2005. 
Subprime mortgage problems are con-
centrated among borrowers who don’t have 
fixed-rate  mortgages.  The  vast  majority  of 
subprime loans have teaser interest rates. Af-
ter two to three years, many reset at higher 
rates and borrowers in some cases also be-
gin making principal payments. This reset-
ting can trigger a dramatic rise in mortgage 
payments,  which  many  borrowers  are  un-
prepared to make.
Q: Is the worst over?
A:  Several  questions  remain  unanswered 
about  the  ramifications  of  the  pullback  in 
nonprime  lending—regarding  home  con-
struction, foreclosures and home prices.
Q: OK, let’s start with home construction.
A: Unwinding the dramatic rise in nonprime 
mortgages  could  have  a  noticeable  effect 
on home construction beyond what we’ve 
seen through the first quarter. Some industry 
analysts speculate that the lending pullback 
could slow homebuilding another 10 to 15 
percent. At this point, though, it’s hard to 
gauge the full impact. With nonprime lend-
ing at nearly 40 percent last year, the effect 
could be even greater.
Q: What about the outlook for foreclosures?
A:  According  to  the  Mortgage  Bankers  As-
sociation, foreclosures initiated in the fourth 
cases, borrowers fall into the Alt-A category 
because they didn’t provide the documenta-
tion of income normally required to get a 
conforming loan.
The Alt-A mortgage market is new. In 
2001,  it  accounted  for  only  3  percent  of 
mortgage originations. But by 2006, Alt-A’s 
share had risen to 16 percent. When you add 
up subprime and Alt-A, you really begin to 
appreciate their importance. As recently as 
2003, they accounted for 11 percent of origi-
nations; by last year, the total had risen to 
nearly 40 percent. 
Q: Have problems with these mortgages 
caused any ripples?
A: We’re likely in the midst of a shakeout 
that will cause some retrenchment in mort-
gage availability. We’ve already seen more 
than 70 mortgage lenders close, with more 
sure to follow. Keep in mind, though, that 
there are still more than 8,000 lenders.
Keep in mind, too, that many subprime 
loans haven’t gone sour, and the advent of 
subprime lending has increased homeowner-
ship. In addition, expanded credit availabil-
ity has helped younger families buy bigger 
homes, which will help them avoid many of 
the costs previous generations encountered “We’re likely in the midst of a shakeout 
that will cause some retrenchment in 
mortgage availability.”
quarter rose to a record high of 0.5 percent. 
Looking down the road, though, it’s difficult 
to forecast how much foreclosure rates could 
rise. For one thing, home-price trends have 
changed dramatically. 
The  decline  in  documentation  adds 
uncertainty about the debt service burdens 
of many nonprime borrowers. According to 
Credit Suisse, subprime loans with low to no 
documentation rose from 30 percent in 2001 
to 60 percent in 2006. On the Alt-A side, the 
share of low- to no-documentation mortgag-
es rose from 66 percent to 81 percent.
Q: Finally, where do you think home prices are 
headed?
A: Open questions remain about how much 
the increase in mortgage availability in recent 
years pushed up home demand and prices. 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • MAY/JUNE 2007    9    SouthwestEconomy
with attractive home prices, bodes well for the Texas housing 
industry’s future. 
Q: How much has Texas relied on subprime and Alt-A financing?
A: According to Credit Suisse, subprime mortgages’ share of 
the Texas market was about 22 percent in 2006, slightly higher 
than the U.S. average of 20 percent. Subprime loans tend to be 
more prevalent in lower-income areas, which would explain 
Texas’ slightly higher share. Texas’ share of Alt-A loans was 13 
percent, below the nation’s 20 percent. 
Q: Why have the state’s foreclosure rates tended to be higher?
A: The Texas foreclosure rate began running higher than the 
national average in 2002. At that time, the Texas economy was 
mired in a recession, spurred by the high-tech bust. The state 
had a large share of high-tech employment, and it took several 
years for job losses to level off. Many who lost their jobs were 
white-collar workers, so a large share of foreclosures involved 
conventional prime loans. 
The Texas economy has been strong for several years, yet 
the state’s foreclosure rates remain high. This probably has a lot 
to do with the moderate rate of home-price appreciation dur-
ing the housing boom. Unlike homeowners in California and 
Florida, Texans who got in over their heads were unable to tap 
their home’s equity to make mortgage payments. 
So it’s hard to forecast the 
impact of the recent pull-
back in lending. It will like-
ly vary across the country, 
partly  because  nonprime 
mortgages have tended to 
be used more on the coasts, 
where borrowers have had 
to reach to qualify to buy. 
Take  California,  for  ex-
ample.  In  2006,  nonprime 
loans accounted for 55 per-
cent of originations, compared with 40 per-
cent for the nation. 
Previous  regional  price  misalignments 
have unwound, with home prices remaining 
roughly flat for many years, while incomes 
and  other  prices  rose.  Nevertheless,  some 
noticeable  home-price  declines  did  occur 
in  the  early  1990s.  But  the  decade’s  long 
economic expansion allowed households to 
work through the realignment. 
By keeping inflation under control, the 
Fed hopes to sustain the current economic 
expansion, which should enable many, but 
not all, of today’s households and lenders to 
work through their mortgage quality prob-
lems.
D’Ann Petersen, the Dallas Fed’s 
regional housing analyst, discusses 
developments in Texas.
Q: How are Texas housing markets 
faring compared with those in the rest 
of the country?
A: They’ve cooled, but they’re hold-
ing up better than in other areas. While home sales remain 
good by historical standards, they’ve moderated from last year’s 
vigorous pace. That’s not to say all Texas markets are in sync. 
Austin and Houston sales remain at good levels, while the Dal-
las–Fort Worth housing market is the weakest among the major 
metros. Hardest hit have been homes priced below $200,000. 
Sales remain strong at higher price points. 
Builders have pulled back significantly on new home starts, 
especially in Dallas–Fort Worth, as inventories rose with slower 
sales, rising cancellations and reduced investor activity. Tighter 
lending standards have also dampened demand, especially at the 
market’s lower end. Problems with subprime mortgages could re-
duce starts even more. 
Our business contacts remain cautiously optimistic, how-
ever. Housing prices have held firm in Texas, unlike other ar-
eas of the country, and have even ticked up recently. While 
there will be some short-term pain from reduced construction 
and layoffs, the state economy’s continued expansion, along 